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1. The Public International Law & Policy Group (“PILPG”) offers the following amicus
curiae observations pursuant to the Decision No. ICC-01/04-02/06-2569. PILPG is
willing to appear before the Court if it would assist. Prof. Paul R. Williams, Dean 
Michael P. Scharf, Prof. Milena Sterio, Dr. Brianne McGonigle Leyh, Dr. Julie Fraser, 
Jonathan Worboys, Eian Katz, Raghavi Viswanath, Nicole Carle, Alexandra Koch, 
Isabela Karibjanian, and Olivia Wang contributed to these observations. 
1. Questions (A) (Definitions and Distinctions)
2. While not limited to a single meaning in international law, “attack(s)” is defined in
Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I (API) as “acts of violence against the adversary, 
whether in offence or in defence.” The same definition applies to non-international armed
conflicts.1 It is traditionally thought that “attacks” occur during the “conduct of
hostilities,”2 or the period of armed conflict during which “combat action” (the “methods
and means of warfare”) takes place.3 However, the meaning of “attack(s)” is broader in 
the context of hospitals and cultural property and, as the Common Legal 
Representative of the Victims (CLR2) submits,4 must account for the conduct of 
hostilities and its aftermath. This would include a ratissage operation, which is a series
of acts committed outside the conduct of hostilities that may include the abduction, 
assault, or killing of civilians and the ransacking or looting of their dwellings.5 
3. Rather than the term “attack(s),” protections for cultural property in international
humanitarian law (IHL) are often defined by reference to “act(s) of hostility.”6 An “act 
1 International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1987), ¶ 4783 (“ICRC Commentary of 1987”). 
2 ICRC, Commentary of 1987, ¶ 1880.
3 ICRC, International Law on the Conduct of Hostilities: Overview (2010). See also ICRC, Handbook on 
International Rules Governing Military Operations; Robert Kogod Goldman, International Humanitarian
Law: Americas Watch’s Experience in Monitoring Internal Armed Conflicts, 9 Am. U. Int’l. L. Rev. 49, 73
(1993).
4 Observations of the Common Legal Representative of the Victims of the Attacks on the Prosecution’s
Appeal against the Trial Judgment, ¶ 15 (“CLR2 Brief”).
5 Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Summary of Trial Chamber VI, Judgment, ¶ 34
(Jul. 8, 2019).
6 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 4, May
14, 1954 (“1954 Hague Convention”); APII art. 16.
No: ICC-01/04-02/06 A2 3/8 18 September 2020
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of hostility” is broader in temporal and substantive scope than an “attack,” limited
neither by the adversarial element nor the ordinary association with the conduct of 
hostilities,7 and thus inclusive of ratissage operations.
2. Questions (B) (Meaning of Article 8(2)(e)(iv))
Sub-question (1): the term “attack(s)” in Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute extends
further in time than in other Articles and includes ratissage operations.
4. Four compelling reasons support an interpretation of “attack(s)” that extends
beyond the conduct of hostilities and includes ratissage operations. 
5. First, the “established framework of international law,” which shapes the meaning of all
subparagraphs in Article 8(2)(e),8 protects hospitals and cultural property9 well 
beyond the hostilities phase of armed conflict. Under IHL, such properties are 
protected “at all times”10 and against all “act[s] of hostility,”11 meaning all substantially
detrimental “act[s] arising from the conflict.”12 The drafters of Additional Protocol II
(APII) were especially concerned to prevent retaliatory action taken against hospitals
or cultural property during post-hostilities ratissage operations, as illustrated by an 
earlier version of Article 16 stating that such properties “must not be made the object of
reprisals.”13 This same concern is reflected in the final language of Article 16, which 
broadly protects cultural property against “acts of hostility,” as opposed to the 
narrower protection against “attacks” granted to other forms of property in APII.14 
7  ICRC, Commentary of 1987, ¶ 2070 (“An act of hostility must be understood as any act arising from the
* 
conflict which has or can have a substantial detrimental effect on [ ] protected objects”).
8  Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No.ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgment, ¶ 53 (Jun. 15, 2017).
9  As the Prosecution observes, hospitals and cultural property must be treated identically under Article 
8(2)(e)(iv). Prosecution Appeal Brief, No. ICC-01/04-02/06-2432, 7 October 2019 (the “Prosecution Brief”), 
¶¶ 109, 116. Conclusions drawn as to the scope of protection afforded to one are therefore 
 equally 
applicable to the other.
10 APII art. 11. See also ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 28 (2005) (finding that hospitals are protected 
 
under customary IHL “in all circumstances”).
11  1954 Hague Convention art. 4; APII art. 16.
12  ICRC, Commentary of 1987, ¶ 2070.
13  Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Report on the Work of the Conference, Second Session,
 
vol. 1, ¶ 2494 (Jul. 1972).
14 APII art. 15.
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6. Second, a textualist study of the origins of Article 8(2)(e)(iv) and a review of the
relevant drafting history lead to the conclusion that “attack(s)” was intended to include 
ratissage operations. The language of Article 8(2)(e)(iv) is sourced largely from two
provisions of the 1907 Hague Regulations: Article 27, which applies during “sieges and 
bombardments,” and Article 56, which applies during occupation. While the Defence 
contends that by 1997 the drafters of the Statute had ceased considering Article 56,15 
an ICRC analysis presented by several States to the Preparatory Commission in 1999 
acknowledges its continued influence on Article 8(2)(e)(iv).16 
7. Even if it is accepted, arguendo, that Article 56 was “dropped” from the negotiations
of Article 8(2)(e)(iv), the term “attack(s)” nonetheless extends further than the Defence 
asserts based on a close reading of the language of Article 27 alone. A key point not
developed in the briefs is that “sieges17 and bombardments”18 are each subclasses of the 
umbrella category of “attacks.” The shift from “sieges and bombardments” in Article 27 
to “attacks” in Article 8(2)(e)(iv) thus represents a conscious choice to expand the scope 
of protection beyond the conduct of hostilities. This interpretation is also bolstered by
the conceptual similarity between “sieges” and ratissage operations, both of which 
connote continuous action in areas where hostile forces have assumed elements of 
effective control not necessarily amounting to an occupation.19 
15 Defence Response to Prosecution Appeal Brief, 7 Oct. 2019 (ICC-01/04-02/06), No. ICC-01/04-02/06-
2449, 9 Dec. 2019 (the “Defence Response”), ¶ 20.
16 Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Request from the Governments of
Belgium, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungary, the Republic of Korea, South Africa and the Permanent Observer
Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations regarding the text prepared by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross on article 8, paragraph 2 (e) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (ix) and (x), of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, Preparatory Commission for the ICC at 19, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF/2/Add.3
(Nov. 24, 1999).
17 Gloria Gaggioli, Are Sieges Prohibited under Contemporary IHL?, EJIL:Talk! (Jan. 30, 2019); Emanuela-
Chiara Gillard, Sieges, the Law and Protecting Civilians, CHATHAM HOUSE at 8 (Jun. 2019).
18 That “bombardment” is a type of “attack” is evident from the phrase “attack by bombardment,” which
appears in API art. 51(5)(a) and was proposed for adoption in APII but ultimately rejected. Draft APII
submitted by the ICRC to the Diplomatic Conference leading to the Adoption of the Additional
Protocols, art. 26(3)(a).
19 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Sieges, the Law and Protecting Civilians, CHATHAM HOUSE at 8 (Jun. 2019)
(commenting that a siege is defined by control over “entry and egress from a particular area, and thus
movement in and out of weapons and ammunition, supplies and people”). See also CLR2 Brief, ¶ 35.
No: ICC-01/04-02/06 A2 5/8 18 September 2020
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8. Third, the object and purpose of the Rome Statute supports an interpretation of
“attack(s)” in Article 8(2)(e)(iv) that includes ratissage operations, even if the same term
is interpreted otherwise elsewhere in the Statute. Counter to the Defence position,20 
the Court’s adoption of the API Article 49(1) definition of “attack(s)” with respect to
other provisions of the Statute need not determine its approach to the specific instance 
of Article 8(2)(e)(iv). The Statute features many terms with contextually variant
meanings, such as “torture,”21 “conduct,”22 and “jurisdiction.”23 When competing
interpretations exist, the principle of effectiveness counsels the selection of the one 
that best fulfils the treaty’s object and purpose,24 which in this case is to safeguard the 
international-law protections for hospitals and cultural property.
9. Fourth, a broader conception of “attack(s)” is required in order to avoid leaving a
chronological gap in IHL protections for hospitals and cultural property during the 
intermediate phase of conflict (during which ratissage operations frequently occur) 
between the conclusion of the conduct of hostilities and the formal onset of 
occupation. The ICTY has allowed that such a gap may exist for property generally, 
but not for civilians.25 The heightened IHL protections afforded to hospitals and
cultural property vis a vis other classes of property, though, suggest that this gap
should not be permitted to persist under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) either. This argument is
20 Defence Response Brief, ¶¶ 10–11.
21 Compare International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes art. 7(1)(f) (2013) with International Criminal
Court, Elements of Crimes art. 8(2)(a)(ii)-1, 8(2)(c)(i)-4 (2013).
22 Michail Vagias, The Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: Certain Contested Issues
(2011) (published Ph.D. thesis, Bynkers Hoek Publishing) at 113–14, 120 (commenting that Arts. 30–31 
endorse the “act theory” understanding of “conduct” whereas Art. 12(2)(a) potentially admits the 
converse “ubiquity principle”).
23 Britta Lisa Krings, The Principle of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction in International Criminal
Law: Antagonists or Perfect Match? 4 Goettingen J. Int’l. L. 737, 754–56 (2012) (commenting that the 
concept of “jurisdiction” as used in Art. 17 may be inclusive of universal jurisdiction whereas it is limited
in Art. 12 to personal and territorial jurisdiction).
24 International Law Commission, Reports of the International Law Commission on the second part of its
seventeenth session and on its eighteenth session, vol. II, ¶ 6, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1996).
25 Prosecutor v. Naletilić, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-34-T, ¶¶ 216–22 (Mar. 31, 2003) (ruling that, unlike 
protections for individuals under the Geneva Conventions, protections for property under occupation 
do not apply until territory is “actually placed under the authority of the hostile army”).
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substantively similar to the CLR2’s “sufficiently close[ ] relat[ion]” test,26 and offers
further support for arriving at the same conclusion. 
Sub-question (2): the term “attack(s)” in Article 8(2)(e)(iv) covers acts such as
pillaging and destruction.
10. There are three significant grounds that support recognizing that the substantive
scope of “attack(s)” under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) includes pillaging and destruction.
11. First, reading “attack(s)” to include pillaging and destruction comports with the
object and purpose of the Rome Statute and the established framework of 
international law. The drafting history of Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute is
replete with evidence of the drafters’ intention to incorporate the heightened
protections accorded to hospitals and cultural property under the 1907 Hague 
Regulations and the 1954 Hague Convention.27 The IHL prohibition of vandalism and
demolition of cultural property,28 which applies during non-international armed
conflict under customary law,29 forms an integral part of this protective regime, as the 
ICTY has recognized.30 
12. Second, pillaging of cultural property as an “attack” under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) is
categorically distinct from the crimes of pillaging and destruction of civilian objects
under Articles 8(2)(e)(v) and 8(2)(e)(xii) and therefore recognized as lex specialis.31 In 
contrast to Articles 8(2)(e)(v) and (xii), Article 8(2)(e)(iv) captures a different sort of 
26  CLR2 Brief, ¶ 15.
27  Preparatory Committee for the International Criminal Court Proceedings (Mar.-Apr. 1996), ¶ 41; UN 
Doc.A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, ¶¶ 44, 48, 62, 63, 64; UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.4; UN Doc. A/CONF.183/
C.1/SR.5, ¶¶ 66, 81. The drafters were careful not to confine the protections to only those 
 properties 
designated by States. See UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.5, ¶ 66.
28  1954 Hague Convention art. 4(3).
29  ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 52 (2005). This is also a binding treaty obligation for 86 State 
parties to the Rome Statute who have signed the 1954 Hague Convention.
30 UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as amended
* 
on 17 May 2002) art. 3(d), 25 May 1993; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, Case No. 
IT-95-14-A, ¶ 533 (Jul. 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No. IT- 
95-14/2-T (Feb. 26, 2001). In some cases, the ICTY has also characterized destructive acts against cultural 
property as “attacks.” See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No. IT-01-42-T, ¶¶ 446, 
461 (Jan. 31, 2005).
31  Prosecutor v. Strugar, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, Case No. IT-01-42-A, ¶ 277 (Jul. 17, 2008); 
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, ¶ 16 (Sept. 26, 2016).
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injury,32 which the Court in Al Mahdi (Reparations Order) described as a “moral harm” 
in light of its effect on the human community at large.33 In order to give effect to this
“communal dimension”34 inherent to cultural property, therefore, a wide reading of 
Article 8(2)(e)(iv) that includes pillaging and destruction should be given. 
13. Third, an expansive reading of “attack(s)” is compatible with an evolutionary
interpretation of international law. With the advent of cyber-attacks, there is
increasing support for the view that attacks do not require violent physical effects,35 
provided they cause or intend to cause loss of functionality.36 The ICRC has found that
disabling communication functions of critical infrastructure or cutting off electricity
supply from a hospital would qualify as “attacks.”37 Analogously, acts that
substantially inhibit hospitals and cultural property from performing their societal 
functions—such as pillaging and destruction—can qualify as “attacks.”
For the Public International Law & Policy Group: 
Professor Paul R. Williams Professor Michael P. Scharf Professor Milena Sterio
Dated: 18 September 2020
Done at Washington D.C. and Cleveland, Ohio
32 Consequently, cumulative charging under Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) and Art. 8(2)(e)(v) or 8(2)(e)(xii) will not 
breach the “fair labeling” requirements of the Rome Statute. See Glanville Williams, Convictions and 
Fair
* Labelling, 42 Cambridge L.J. at 85 (1983).
33 Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Reparations Order, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, ¶¶ 14–15, 84–86 (Aug. 17, 
2017). Compare Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No. IT-01-47-T, ¶ 63 (Mar. 15, 
2006) with Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No. IT-01-47-T, ¶ 49 (Mar. 15, 
2006).
34 Serge Brammertz et. al., Attacks against cultural heritage as a weapon of war, 14 J. of Int’l. Crim. Just. 1143, 

 1154 (2016). See also UNESCO World Heritage Convention arts. 5(a), 6(1), Nov. 16, 1972.
35 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
*
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, ¶¶ 255-56 (2nd ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2016) (on 
Common Article 2.); See Tallinn Manual 2.0, ¶¶ 10–12 at 417–18 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) (on Rule 
 
92).
36 ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflict (Oct. 31, 2015) at 
 
41; Law of War Manual, ¶ 16.5.1 (U.S. Department of Defense 2015).
37 ICRC, The potential human cost of cyber operations (May 29, 2019) at 73; S.C. Res. 2286 (May 3, 2016); 
See
* also S.C. Res. 1988 (Jun. 17, 2011).
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